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Bram Büscher
Inverted Commons: Africa’s Nature in the Global Imagination1
Nature in Africa has long occupied a special place in the global imagination: the pre-
vailing images associated with the continent are of a “wild Eden,” of rugged, “pristine” 
landscapes, and of some of the world’s most charismatic “megafauna” (elephants, go-
rillas, rhinos, etc.) (Adams and McShane 1996). Indeed, whereas references to Africa’s 
people are often negative and associated with war, poverty, and famine (Dowden 2008), 
Africa’s nature is habitually framed in positive terms: nature as it “should be,” “un-
spoiled” and “pure.” Thus, when the famous Virgin millionaire entrepreneur Richard 
Branson asks the question “What is Africa?” there seems to be no irony in his answer, 
“Africa is its animals. That is the beauty of Africa, that’s what makes it different from the 
rest of the world. And to lose those animals would be catastrophic.” Branson lays the 
blame for “dwindling wildlife numbers” squarely on “Africa’s increasing (human) popu-
lations,” and argues that Africa should “increase the amount of land for the animals and 
by increasing the amount of land for the animals, that will help human beings.”2 
The purpose of this short piece is to argue that nature and natural resources in Africa 
are framed as “inverted commons”: a special commons that belongs to the entire 
globe, but for which only Africans pay the real price in terms of their conservation. 
Updating and extending Ton Dietz’s earlier argument about entitlements to natural 
resources (Dietz 1996), I argue that this happens in two crucial ways. First, a variety 
of conservation actors, particularly from the West, actively frame Africa’s nature as a 
global commons that deserves protection for all of humanity. Second, the practical 
manifestation of this tactic increasingly revolves around “neoliberal conservation”: 
reinterpreting and re-institutionalizing African natures within ideologies of power and 
systems of rule dependent on market competition, commoditization, and intensified 
capital accumulation (Sullivan 2006, 2009; Igoe and Brockington 2007; Brockington et 
al. 2008; Igoe 2010; Büscher 2010a, 2010b; Fletcher 2010; Arsel and Büscher 2012). 
As there is no space to develop these arguments in depth, I will present one example—
that of the Serengeti—followed by a brief discussion and conclusion.3  
1 This piece is a summary of my article, “The Neoliberalisation of Nature in Africa,” in New Topographies of 
Power? Africa Negotiating an Emerging Multi-polar World,	ed.	Ton	Dietz	et	al.	(Leiden:	Brill,	2011),	84–109.
2	 “The	Elephant	Corridor,”	Pifworld,	accessed	7	February	2011,	http://www.pifworld.com/#/projects/TheE-
lephantCorridor/61. 
3	 I	refer	the	interested	reader	to	Büscher	(2011),	where	the	argument	is	worked	out	in	full.
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The Serengeti: Threats to an “African Eden”
As David Hughes recently argued (2010, 133), “contemporary conservation dabbles in 
nostalgia for the colonial past [and] continues to produce the aesthetics, symbols, and 
fables of white privilege.” This is particularly true for tourism to the African continent 
(Dunn 2004; Duffy 2010), which in its marketing and advertising often ends up perpetu-
ating stereotypes of African nature as devoid of people and reinforcing the “aesthetics, 
symbols, and fables of white privilege.” It very rarely, if ever, works to upset these sym-
bols and fables, because they involve major capital flows and international investments 
that few African governments are willing to forego. Nevertheless, they are occasionally 
challenged, and African “Edens” come under “threat” from African desires to use land 
and resources differently. When this happens, there is frequently a global outcry, largely 
from white Westerners. One such prominent occasion recently was the international 
debate that erupted after the Tanzanian government proposed to construct a highway 
through its Serengeti National Park. 
The Serengeti is one of the best-known symbols of “Africa’s wild nature,” and its wilde-
beest migration figures prominently in global conservation imaginations. Thus, in July 
2010, when the Tanzanian government followed up on an earlier election promise 
to construct a highway through the northern part of the park, it triggered a massive 
global outcry. International (mainly Western) audiences resisted in numerous ways, 
showing that African nature is not only important in the global imagination, but is also 
seen as something that belongs to the entire globe and over which Africans have only 
partial sovereignty (Mbembe 2001). As the outpouring was truly prodigious, I present 
only some of the major initiatives.
• An internet site was established (http://www.savetheserengeti.org/), stating that 
“this ill-conceived project changes all the rules, and would destroy the integrity of a 
priceless world heritage that has been protected by the people of Tanzania since the 
birth of their country. It would also cause grave danger to their entire tourist indus-
try.” Like Richard Branson, the website organizers blame population growth: “Areas 
to the west of the Serengeti are already heavily populated. A highway will add even 
more human population and development.”
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• An online petition was organized, urging readers to send Tanzanian President Kik-
wete an email that ends as follows: “The world is watching and expecting good 
governance, and for you to find a way to preserve your great country’s natural in-
heritance and future potential for advancement.”4 Of the 248,500 signatories, the 
vast majority are from North America or Europe, with hardly any signatories from 
African countries.
• A major survey was carried out, involving “302 international scientists from 32 
countries,”5 which concludes that “the road will result in severe, negative, irreversi-
ble impacts, with little mitigation possible.” Again, the vast majority of signatories 
are from Western countries. (Those that profess to be from African countries are 
mainly Westerners that live and work in Africa, or white South Africans.)
• A Facebook group called “Stop the Serengeti Highway” was established, with over 
46,500 “friends” as of June 2012.6
• Twenty-four scientists, led by Western conservationists/biologists, published an ar-
ticle in Nature entitled “Road will Ruin Serengeti.” They write that “the proposed 
road could lead to the collapse of the largest remaining migratory system on Earth—
a system that drives Tanzania’s tourism trade and supports thousands of people.” 
They ask the Tanzanian government to “explicitly acknowledge and conserve the 
global benefits of preserving the Serengeti National Park, one of the world’s natural 
wonders and one of Africa’s last surviving pristine ecosystems”7 (italics added).
In all, considerable pressure has been placed on the Tanzanian government to rethink 
the road, with even UNESCO threatening to take the Serengeti off of the World Heritage 
4	 “Action	Alert:	Tanzania’s	Proposed	Serengeti	Highway	Threatens	Greatest	Wildlife	Migration	on	Earth,”	
Forests.org,	accessed	8	December	2010,	http://forests.org/shared/alerts/sendsm.aspx?id=tanzania_ser-
engeti.	See	also	the	update	“World	Scientists	Petition	for	Alternate	Highway	/	Warn	of	Dangers,”	Bwana,	
Serengeti	Watch,	accessed	27	December	2010,	http://www.savetheserengeti.org/news/highway-news/
world-scientists-petition-for-alternate-highwaywarn-of-dangers/.
5	 “Environmental	Impact	Statement:	Effects	on	the	Ecology	and	Wildlife	of	a	Proposed	Commercial	Route	
through	the	Serengeti	National	Park,”	accessed	8	December	2010,	http://www.savetheserengeti.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/10/SENAPA_ENV_IMPACT_10_3.pdf.
6	 Accessed	20	June	2012,	http://www.facebook.com/pages/STOP-THE-SERENGETI-HIGH-
WAY/125601617471610.
7 Andrew Dobson et al., Nature 467:	272–73.	See	also:	Katherine	Homewood,	Daniel	Brockington,	and	Sian	
Sullivan, “Alternative view of Serengeti road,” Nature 467:	788–789.
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List if the plan continues.8 While the above is only the tip of the iceberg, and while the 
debate is ongoing and contains diverse viewpoints, it is clearly driven by Western con-
servationists and often harks back to well-trodden neocolonial arguments about wildlife 
and local population growth. Few direct links are made to the Western consumerism 
that is partly responsible for the road (it will be used to transport rare-earth metals more 
rapidly from Lake Victoria to the coast for production in China). At the same time, there 
is hardly any mention of how the Serengeti was produced by evicting Masaai from the 
area during colonial times and how, consequently, the Serengeti is anything but “natur-
al” or pristine. What is particularly salient is that many of the conservationists and their 
supporters feel a sense of “entitlement” to the Serengeti (Dietz 1996), or, as I put it, 
frame the Serengeti as an “inverted commons”—a commons that surpasses Tanzanian 
jurisdiction, and whose value can seemingly be appreciated only by outsiders.
Inverted Commons and the Neoliberalization of Africa’s Nature
International outbursts over African nature, like the one around the Serengeti high-
way, are rare. African conservation politics, heated though it is, seldom attracts inter-
national headlines. However, many of the same emotions, arguments, and political 
strategies play a role in day-to-day conservation, involving thousands of different ac-
tors across hundreds of sites all across the continent. While this diversity precludes 
absolute generalizations, I argue that one major common dynamic can be identified: 
many conservation strategies increasingly depend on the neoliberalization of nature. 
Under global neoliberal restructuring since the 1980s, conservation in Africa has pro-
gressively focused on ways for wildlife and “nature” to “pay their way,” so that local 
and global communities can benefit from their sustained conservation. “Imposing wil-
derness”—as Neumann (1998) referred to it—persists, albeit no longer through colo-
nial force but through “the market.” So-called neoliberal conservation has become the 
new mantra for global conservation, triggering new challenges for Africa.
Through strategies such as the commercialization of the management of parks, eco-
tourism, payments for ecosystem services, carbon trade, and REDD (Reducing Emis-
sions from Deforestation and forest Degradation), Africa’s nature has been increasingly 
8	 “Serengeti	faces	axe	from	heritage	body,”	Lucas	Liganga,	The Citizen,	accessed	8	December	2010,	http://
www.thecitizen.co.tz/component/content/article/37-tanzania-top-news-story/4220-serengeti-faces-axe-
from-heritage-body.html.
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reconstituted in neoliberal terms.9 While this neoliberalization of nature (conservation) 
in Africa is variegated, profoundly uneven, and never linear, I argue that, on the whole, 
this process constitutes a sea change in the relations between Africans and their bio-
diversity and wildlife—one that will have massive implications for both. Yet, as I argue 
above and elaborate on in Büscher (2011), Africa’s nature is being commodified through 
a rhetorical strategy that I refer to as “inverted commons”: the discursive creation of a 
common resource whose global ecological, political, and emotional importance trumps 
the desires and rights of local African actors. This tactic is cynical, particularly given 
how African rights and desires have been and continue to be violated (Mbembe, 2001). 
Moreover, the framing is ironic in that “inverted commons” statements about Africa’s 
nature do not say under what type of regimes these are governed. When these gover-
nance regimes are increasingly neoliberal, they function further to wrest control of Af-
rican ecosystems and wildlife from Africans themselves, as African nature—the global 
commons—is increasingly sold to Western, white investors.
While this framing makes it very difficult to negotiate or challenge the neoliberalization 
of nature in Africa, I want to conclude here by emphasizing that notions of “inverted 
commons” can be deflated quickly when the argument is turned around. While doing 
fieldwork in Zimbabwe, I once heard a Zimbabwean colleague comment that if—in this 
case—Dutch people were so concerned with African elephants and wanted to conserve 
them so badly, then Zimbabwe could put all their elephants on several mega-ships and 
transport them to Rotterdam harbor, adding they would do this “free of charge.” Dutch 
people could then do with them whatever they wanted. These types of reversals bring 
the message home quite vividly: the pressure put on African actors to conserve their 
wildlife and biodiversity often omits the role of outside actors in these pressures and the 
hardship local Africans have to endure while living with (often dangerous) wildlife. It is 
time to put the spotlight back where it belongs.
9	 Here	defined	as	a	political	ideology	(plus	related	practices)	that	attempts	to	subordinate	social	and	politi-
cal affairs to capitalist market dynamics.
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